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Abstract 
This paper discusses the returns to schooling in Cameroon within the informal sector. This is to evaluate to what 
extent having followed the basic education successfully influence the hourly earnings of workers in the informal 
sector. Then it analyzes the benefits of the first cycle of secondary education. The methodology used is based on 
the matching methods and the selection on unobservabl  models. The data used are those of the survey on 
employment and the informal sector conducted in 2005 by Cameroon National Institute of Statistics.  
The results confirm the positive impact of schooling on the income of informal sector workers. The benefits 
brought by the completion of basic education are estimated at 20% in the non-agricultural sector and at 28% 
within the agricultural sector. In addition, if unskilled workers now return to school and obtain the FSLC (or an 
equivalent certificate) this will increase their income by 22% to 25%. The effects of the possession of the GCE-
OL on the income of the workers of the non-agricultural informal sector are estimated to 33%. But in the
agricultural sector this certificate may have no effect on earnings. Education also plays a fundamental role in the 
occupation status of individuals. The probability of entering into the formal sector increases with the level of 
education.  
The study recommends the implementation of measures aiming to increase education supply, especially in rural 
areas, improving the quality of education. There government should implement a national social education policy 
in favor of the poor; take measures for the follow up of the informal sector and facilitate the entry of young 
graduates into the labour market. 
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1. Introduction 
Cameroon has experienced a serious economic slump from 1984 -1993, resulting from, a fall in oil 
prices and the principal cash products (cocoa, coffee). The financial tensions forced the government to 
the liquidation and restructuring of many public and parastatals companies and to downsize the civil 
service. These measures have contributed to deteriorate the labour market and the living conditions of 
people.  
The growth recovered in 1994, following the devaluation of the CFA franc and the initiative for heavily 
indebted poor countries failed to raise the standard of living of Cameroonians. Indeed, data from the 
second Cameroon Households survey (ECAM°2) indicate a poverty rate of 40% (INS, 2002). The 
results of the survey on Employment and the Informal Sector (EESI), in 2005, indicate a situation of 
under-employment and widespread informal activities (75.8% and 90.4% respectively, INS, 2005a). 
Because work is the main source of income of Cameroonians, employment should be taken into account 
in strategies to fight against poverty. That is why t e sixth axis of Cameroon Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper (PRSP, 2003) focused on the developmnt and implementation of a national 
employment policy incorporated to the national poverty strategy. 
In this perspective, the question of the benefits of schooling is essential: education significantly 
influences the income of workers which in turn, determines the state of poverty of households. In fact, 
education influences the hourly earnings of workers of all the institutional sectors (public, private, 
formal, non-agricultural informal and agricultural informal). For example, in the agricultural sector, he 
average hourly income in the main activity increased from 80 CFA francs for non-school workers to 
223 CFA francs for workers with a bachelor's degree or higher (INS, 2005a). Furthermore, the 
educational level of the head of household significantly influences on the likelihood for a household t  
be poor (INS, 2002). In addition, schooling plays an important role on the mode of absorption of 
individuals into Cameroon’s labour market. For example, the unemployment rate or the duration of 
unemployment increases with the level of education (INS, 2005a). 
The main objective of this article is to evaluate th benefits of a worker of the informal sector in terms 
of income, for having completed primary education successfully; that is, obtaining at least the First 
School Leaving Certificate (FSLC) or an equivalent certificate. It also seeks to estimate the benefits o  
the first cycle of secondary education (obtaining the General Certificate of Education Ordinary Level 
(GCE-OL)). 
For a long time, as noted by Bennell (1996), many studies on returns to schooling in developing 
countries were limited to workers of the formal sector while ignoring the informal sector where the 
benefits of education were supposed to be very low. Then the role of primary education in the informal 
sector income was recognized with sometimes the reservation that primary education had an impact on 
informal sector income only if the primary education was completed (3 years of schooling not worth not 
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more than 0 years, what mattered was the completion of this cycle). These findings have prompted 
international organizations to advocate for the completion of primary education at the expense of 
advocacy of school attendance. Today, the role of secondary education on informal sector income is 
also proven (Keupie t al, 2008). 
In practice, there are two types of methods for assessing the impact: experimental methods and quasi-
experimental or non experimental methods. For both methods, there are two groups: the treated group 
made up of individuals who have received treatment (here, having obtained FSLC) and the non-treated 
group (control group) comprising individuals who have not received treatment (here, not having 
obtained the FSLC).  
When exposure to treatment is random (case of experimental methods), then, the analysis of the impact 
of a policy can be measured simply by comparing the av rage score of the two groups (here, the 
average income of both groups). If the treatment is ot random, as is the case here because the right to 
obtain the FSLC is not random, this simple comparison  biased. That is why the ordinary least squares 
method (OLS) proposed by Mincer (1962), naively used, l ads to non-convergent estimators because of 
the endogeneity of education (Heckman et al, (1997); Blundell et al, (2000), Sianesi Barbara, (2002)). 
Indeed, there are variables affecting both the fact of obtaining the FSLC and the level of income. It is 
then necessary to use impact evaluation methods that take into account the differences ex-ante of the 
variable of interest between individuals of the trea ed group and individuals of the control group; it is 
the selection to treatment. These methods are: the matching method, the instrumental variables method, 
selection models and the double differences method.  
The advantage of the matching method is that it is nonparametric, therefore does not conjecture on 
income and residuals distribution. However, it is ba ed on the assumption that the selection is based on 
observable variables. This is to say that, what distinguishes a person with the FSLC and an individual 
not having it can be observed. But this assumption is very strong. There may be unobservable variables 
affecting the school courses and earnings (for example the intellectual quotient). The verification of this 
hypothesis requires a lot of variables describing the status of the individual before treatment and 
predicting the likelihood of obtaining the FSLC.  
Accepting this hypothesis obviously solves the problem of endogeneity of the model. Thus, it is not 
necessary to have an instrument as it is the case in instrumental variables method (IVM)1, which 
requires having at least one instrument that affects ducation, but that does not affect income other than
through education. Matching method does not require instrumentals variables. The matching on 
propensity score summarizes the information contained in a large number of variables explaining 
exposure treatment into a probability to be treated Rausenbaum et al, (1983).  
                                                
1 See Altonji and Dunn (1996) ; Behrman et al. (1996) or Bonjour et. al. (2000), for applications of instrumental 
variables methods. 
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However, this matching has certain limits. Because obtaining the status of independence that allows the 
identification of parameters may require the introduction of too many conditional variables; those 
variables are not always accessible. The relevance of the analysis is also reducing, because the 
possibilities of matching an individual to another are reduced, when we better explain exposure to 
treatment. In addition, the matching on observable method is mechanical and based on a purely 
statistical property, which in practice is difficult to justify from the behaviour of agents Bruno Crépon, 
(2005). It may be preferable to model jointly the potential earnings of workers and schooling. This 
yields to the selection on unobservable model which is a parametric model.  
The rest of the document is divided as follows. Section 2 presents the data used and the characteristics 
of informal sector workers. Section 3 presents the models used for estimating the impact of education 
on the income of informal sector workers. Section 4 presents the results of which the conclusions and 
recommendations are presented in section 5. 
2. Econometric models  
2.1 Presentation of the model for the evaluation of the impact of the possession of the 
FSLC on the earnings of informal sector workers 
The causal model of Rubin (1977) is the canonical model for assessing the treatment impact.  
Let us note T the variable indicating whether the individual is treated or not:  
1         If the worker posses the FSLC (Traeted)






The earning of a worker i may be expressed as follows:   
( )1. 0,1, −+= iiiii TYYTY   (1) 
If 1=iT , the individual is treated, 1,ii YY = .Only 1,iY  is observed. The income 0,iY of the individual if he 
had not been treated is not observed.  
If 0iT = the individual is non-treated, 0,ii YY = . Only 0,iY  is observed. The income 1,iY of the individual 
if he had been treated is not observed.  
0,iY  and 1,iY  are the potential results of treatment; but they are never observed simultaneously at the 
same date for a given individual.  
The causal effect of the possession of FSLC on incomes is: 0,1, ii YY −=∆ . It represents the difference 
between what would be the situation if the individual was treated and what it would be if he was not. 
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This effect is unobservable, since only one of the two potential variables is observed for each individual 
and it is individual; because of this there is a distribution of the causal effect in the population.  
Three parameters are studied: 
The average effect of education in the population of educated workers: ( )1 0 1TT E Y Y T∆ = − =  
The average effect of education among the uneducated workers: ( )1 0 0TNT E Y Y T∆ = − =  
The average treatment effect in the population: ( )01 YYEATE −=∆ . 
The selection bias in treatment  
If the outcome variables are independent of the treatm nt variable, this is if( ) TYY ⊥10, , then these 
three parameters of interest are identifiable and equal.  
( ) ( )1 0TT TNT ATE E Y T E Y T∆ = ∆ = ∆ = = − =   (2)  
They may simply be estimated as the difference of the average incomes observed in the group of 
workers having the FSLC and the group of workers who do not have it. If the independence assumption 
is no longer satisfied, the difference in average incomes is affected by a selection bias. Indeed,  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 0
1 0 0 0
1 0 1 0
1 1 1 0
TT TT
E Y T E Y T E Y T E Y T
E Y T E Y T E Y T E Y T
B
= − = = = − =




( ) ( )0 01 0TTB E Y T E Y T= = − = . This term is the selection bias. This bias would have been zero if 
the average income of educated individuals was, in absence of treatment, equal to the one of  
non-educated workers. In other words, if educated an non-educated workers were similar before 
treatment. The full independence between the potential outcomes (Y0, Y1) and obtaining the FSLC is a 
highly unlikely scenario.  
2.2 Matching on observable characteristics  
The alternative to solve the problem of independence is to find a set of observable variables X with 
which the conditional independence between the potential results and obtaining the FSLC is verified; ie 
we must find the vector X such that, ( ) XTYY ⊥10, . This will then make the identification of the 
parameters of interest be possible.  
Each educated individual is associated to a non-educated person called counterfactual, with identical or 
very close X characteristics. The counterfactual individual represents what would have been the 
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situation of the treated individual if it had not been treated. TT∆ can therefore be estimated by the 
difference between the average income of the group of educated workers and the counterfactual group.  
The matching method originally proposed by Rubin (1977) is to match every educated worker i to a 
non-educated person, noted ĩ(i), with the same observable characteristics X. For some treated 
individuals, we can not find an individual having exactly the same characteristics. The estimator 
proposed by Rubin consists to choose a non-treated individual as close as possible to the treated 
individual2.  
Matching Methods on the propensity score  
The conditional independence property generally requi s taking into account a significant number of 
conditional variables. This problem is solved in part by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) showing that if 
( ) XTYY ⊥10,  then, ( ) ( )XPTYY ⊥10,  where ( )XP  is a one-dimension vector summarising the 
vector X of observables. It is therefore sufficient to match individuals on the propensity score, ( )XP . 
But once the score ( )XP  is estimated, it must verify the balance property, that is to say that individuals 
with the same propensity scores have the same distribution of observable variables irrespective of the 
status of treatment. We will test the balance property with the algorithm developed by Andrea Ichino 
and Sascha Becker (2002).  
Among the matching methods used, the easiest is the one-to-one matching with replacement. It 
associated to each treated a non-treated individual having characteristics very close to its own (an 
individual of the control group can be used more than once). The difference between the logarithms of 
average hourly earnings of the two groups (of equal size) is then an estimation of the effect of schooling 
on those who have successfully completed this level ducation3. However, the asymptotic properties 
(convergence and asymptotic normality) of the estimator TT∆  are unknown.  
It is why we will also implement the Epanechnikov kernel matching which Heckman, Ichimura and 
Todd (1998) have shown its convergence (at a speed of N ) and asymptotic normality under certain 
assumptions of regularity. This method consists to associate an educated individual with a fictional non-
educated person, an average person. All non-educated individuals quite close to the educated individual 
i participate in the construction of counterfactual income, with an importance that varies depending on 
the distance between their score and that of the educated worker i. The counterfactual is done with all 
                                                












xxii where Σ  is the variance-covariance matrix of the 
characteristics X in the population of the treated individuals. 
3 To estimate what the non educated individuals losebecause of the lack of education (TNT∆ ), one can take back 
the process while considering like control group the educated individuals. 
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individuals who are within a given bandwidth h. We test the sensitivity of results to multiple values of 
this parameter.  
Observable variables on which the matching will be carried out are first of all variables related to the
worker’s father when the worker was 15 years old. They are a proxy of the situation of the worker 
before treatment. It is about the social professional category of the father (High rank officer; Employee; 
Independent in reference), the sector of activity of the father (dummy that t kes 1 if the father worked 
in the formal private sector, 0 otherwise), the branch of activity of the father (Commerce/Industry; 
Services; Agriculture/Fisheries/Breeding in reference) and the level of education (Secondary and 
higher; Primary; No education in reference). On the other hand, will be introduced in the model, 
individual characteristics which are beyond or independent of his current situation. These variables ar : 
age (and age squared), gender, religion (Christian, Muslim; Other/No religion in reference) and the 
place of birth (Headquarter of province; Headquarter of division/subdivision; Village in reference). But 
finally, we will only keep those of the variables permitting to get a score verifying the balance prope ty.  
2.3 Selection on unobservable model  
The matching methods are based on the assumption that everything that differentiates educated 
individuals from non-educated individuals is observable. It is possible that unobservable variables (or 
variables not available in the database) affect both the likelihood of obtaining the FSLC and the leve of 
income. Thus, we will use the selection on unobservable model, which is another alternative for solving 
the problem of selectivity. This model has the advantage of modelling simultaneously the potential 




i i i i
i i i
i





 = + ∆ +

 = + >
 =
   (4) 
iu  and ie  follow a bivariate with mean zero and a correlation c efficient.ρ. 
We will estimate equation (4) in two stages. We will first estimate the probit model to get a value of the 
inverse Mills ratio (Lambda); then, this variable will be included as an independent in the earnings 
equation in the second stage. 
2.4 Determinants of sectoral allocation and Selection test at the entry into the informal sector  
Labour markets in developing countries are segmented, with each having its own specificities as regards 
to the level of demand, the job quality, the structure and the level of wages (Adams (1991); Schultz 
                                                
4 See Heckman (1979). 
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(2004)). The labour market segmentation in Cameroon can be defined by four sectors: the public sector, 
the private formal sector, the non-agricultural sector and the agricultural sector. A person of working 
age may be in one of the following six situations:  
0 = be inactive; 1 = active and be unemployed; 2 = work in the public sector; 3 = work in the private 
formal sector; 4 = work in the informal non-agricultural sector 5 = work in the formal agricultural 
sector  
The determinants of this "choice" can be estimated using a multinomial logistic model. Let L 
be the variable indicating the situation of working a e persons. The utility of being to the 
institutional sector j is noted jiU  and assumed linear, in iQ , a vector of observable 
characteristics of the individual i 
ijijjij
QU εφ += '   (5) 
The probability that the individual belongs to the s ctor 0j  is the probability that the utility 
0ij
U  gained from membership in this segment 0j  is higher than the levels of utility that he will 
reach in the j other sectors, with 0jj ≠ . 
( ) [ ]( )





 0,...,5 :     , , 0;5
 0,...,5 :     ' ' , , 0;5
ij ij
j j i ij ij
j P L j P U U j j j
j P L j P Q j j jφ φ ν ν
∀ = = = > ≠ ∈
∀ = = = − > − ≠ ∈
  (6) 
Assuming that the errors terms jε are independent and identically distributed according to a 
Weibull distribution, then the residuals difference follows a logistic distribution and the 
likelihood of being in the sector 0j  is given by: 





exp '. '.i j i j i
j
P L j Q Qφ φ
=
= = ∑    (7) 
For the model to be identifiable, 0φ  is assumed to be zero. 
The effect of a variable q  on the probability of belonging to any segment j is given by odds 
ratios (OR).  
For a dummy variable: ( ) ( ) ( ), 1 0OR q j P L j q P L j q= = = = =  
For a continuous variable: ( ) ( ) ( )nqjTPnqjTPjqOR ==+=== 1,  
Paid workers of the informal sector are not chosen randomly in the working age population. The 
restriction of earnings equation on these workers is therefore potentially biased by a selection at the 
entry into the informal sector. In this case where th  selection variable has several modalities, Lee’s 
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model (1983)5 which is an extension of the Heckman method helps to estimate the earnings equations 
while testing the hypothesis on selection of segment.  
For the implementation of this model will not consider the treatment endogeneity bias induced by 
unobservable variables. It is not easy to control both treatment endogeneity and selection to the entry 
into institutional sectors. In addition, the modality inactive and the modality active unemployed will be 
grouped together. Moreover, it is also necessary to assimilate unpaid workers (mostly family-aids and 
apprentices) to inactive or unemployed persons, since they will not belong to the estimation of the 
earnings equations (since the dependent variable is the logarithm of the hourly income of the main 
job)6.  
Thus, in the multinomial logit model at the first stage we have the five following modalities:  
0 = unpaid (inactive, unemployed and unpaid worker); 1 = paid worker in the public sector; 2 = paid 
worker in the formal private sector; 3 = paid worker in the private sector and non-agricultural paid 
workers 4 = paid worker in informal private sector ag iculture.  
The earnings equation is then written:  
' j=1,2,3,4ij j j i j i ijY Z T uα β= + + ∆ +   (8) 
ijY  occurs only if the sector j is chosen by the individual i.  
But, there is a bias because, the residuals iju are correlated to the residuals (jε ) of the sectoral 
allocation equation. We will therefore estimate the following equation:  
' j=1,2,3,4ij j j i j i ij ijY Z Tα β λ κ= + + ∆ + +   (9) 
jλ  corrects the selection bias created by the fact that belonging to the sector rather than another may 
potentially be the result of the action of unobservable variables. In equation (9), residuals jκ are now 
independent of error terms jε of sectoral allocation equation. We will implement this equation with 
Bourguignon et al. (2004)’s Stata program7. 
In the regressions, we will make use of exploratory data analysis (EDA) techniques in order to obtain 
results that are stable, insensitive to possible outliers that could bias the estimates. (Tukey (1997); 
Bienias et al (1994)). 
                                                
5 This model doesn't pose a problem even when Assumption IIA (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives) i not 
verified. 
6 See Kuepie et al. (2008). 
7 This program is available at the following address: http\\:www.pse.ens.fr\senior\gurgand\selmlog13.htm 
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3. The data and some descriptive statistics of the labour market  
3.1 Presentation of the survey 
The data used are those of the Survey on Employment and the Informal Sector (EESI) conducted in 
2005 by the National Institute of Statistics of Cameroon. This is a nation wide operation with two 
phases. During the first phase, was collected the socio demographic and employment data. The second 
phase is a survey on non-agricultural informal production units identified during the first phase. The 
methodology of the survey EESI is actually that of phases 1 and 2 of a 1-2-3 survey; meaning that phase 
3 on household consumption was not done. Only data from the first phase are used here.  
The sampling data set used for the survey is the result of the mapping of the third General Population 
and Housing Census conducted in 2005. A sample of 8°540 households had been drawn following a 
two degree stratified survey design (stratification is done according to the ten provinces and the area of 
residence; that is: urban, semi-urban or rural). 
The working age population is, in accordance with international recommendations, all individuals aged 
15 years and above. The concept of informal sector ch sen for the EESI survey is the one adopted by 
the 1993 System of National Accounts (set of international standards to establish a framework for the 
production of national accounts statistics). The distinction between sectors is made at the enterprise 
level, on the basis of administrative record and the fact of keeping formal accounts. The informal 
enterprises (or informal production units (IPU)) are those that do no have a taxpayer number and / or o
not keep formal accounts. Informal sector workers are persons exercising their main job in informal 
establishments.  
The informal sector can be divided into two segments: the agricultural sector and non-agricultural 
sector. The agricultural informal sector includes workers of informal production units whose main 
activities are: agriculture, livestock (including poultry) and the manufacture of products of animal 
origin, hunting, fishery and pisiculture. The non-agricultural sector comprises workers engaged in non-
agricultural IPU (industry, commerce, services).  
The variable of income used in the estimations is the logarithm of hourly income based on the declared 
monthly income and the number of hours worked. Income includes salary, end of the year bonuses, 
profit sharing, paid leaves, benefits in kind. For self-employed, it refers to the profit or the mixed 
income of their production unit. And for dependent mployees (apprentices and family-aids), their 
earnings is the sum of bonuses in cash or in kind they received if these elements have a regular 
character. 
 11 
3.2 Descriptive Statistics  
The Cameroonian informal sector employs 89.4% of Cameroonian workers aged of 15 and above. 
Workers of this sector are younger than those working in the formal sector. The average age is 32.6 
years in the non-agricultural sector and 37.2 years in the agricultural sector against 37.8 years in the 
formal sector. Women constitute the main workforce of the informal sector. They represent half the 
workforce of non-agricultural informal enterprises and 53.9% of the workforce of the traditional 
primary sector. Conversely, in the formal sector, only one worker out of four is a woman (24.4%).  
Workers of the formal sector are more educated and more skilled than those of the informal sector. 
However, the workforce of the non-agricultural sector is relatively qualified as 56% of the workers of 
this informal sector have completed primary education and 4, 4% of them have obtained the GCE AL, 
degree or a higher education certificate. But in the agricultural sector, workers are generally less 
educated because almost three quarters of them have not obtained the FSLC.  
The number of hours worked per week is higher in the non-agricultural sector than in the agricultural 
sector, due to the fact that agricultural activities are more constrained by the length of the day. 
Moreover, the effect of the possession of FSLC is different in the two sectors since it increases the 
weekly working time in non-agricultural activities and decreases it in agricultural activities. The formal 
sector workers work in average more than those of the informal sector.  
The average income (monthly or hourly) in the non-agricultural sector is more than twice that of 
agricultural sector. Possession of the FSLC increases the average hourly income of 38% in the non-
agricultural sector. This increment is about 79% in the informal agricultural sector; a worker of the 
informal agricultural sector earns more if he has graduated, but he also works longer. Incomes in the 
formal sector are very high compared to those of the informal sector, in fact, a worker of the formal 
sector averagely earns 3.9 times more than one exercising in non-agricultural sector and 8.8 times more 
than a worker of the rural sector. 
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Table 1 : Workers’ characteristics and jobs’ characteristics according to the institutional sector (15 years 








Percentage of persons working in the sector 10.7 37.1 52.2 
Average age 37.8 32.6 37.2 
Proportion of women 24.4 49.4 53.9 
Average number of school years completed 10.9 5.9 3.4 
No education 1.1 19.4 35.8 
Primary 17.8 40.0 46.8 
Secondary 1er cycle 23.9 28.0 14.4 
Secondary 2nd cycle and + 57.3 12.6 2.9 
Level of education 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
No certificate 6.9 43.8 73.8 
FSLC 29.3 40.4 22.5 
GCE-OL/PROBATOIRE 25.0 11.4 2.9 
GCE-AL and + 38.9 4.4 0.8 
Highest certificate 




FSLC and more 
44.2 
45.0 32.1 







22 902 (162) 11 485 (86) 
FSLC and more 
118°433 (713) 
32 150 (224) 15 942 (154) 
Average monthly income 
(Average hourly income) 
(in CFAF)  Total 
113°847 (682) 
28 263 (198) 12 771 (105) 
Source : EESI (2005), Phase1. Our calculations; weighted data. 
4. Results  
The results are based on the sample of informal sector paid workers, whose fathers were alive when 
they were 15 years and have briefed the question of the level of the father.  
4.1 Naive estimate of the effect of FSLC on earnings in the informal sector  
The OLS regressions carried out indicate that whatever the segment, the model is globally significant t 
1%. The variable FSLC is also significant at 1%. But all the variables are not significant in both models. 
Indeed, the variable potential experience is not significant in the agricultural informal segment and 
variable religion is not in the non-agricultural segment. We note that several other factors (such as the 
characteristics of production units) may also explain the income of workers in the informal sector in 
Cameroon, since the two models explain less than 13% of income dispersion.  
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The results show that the effect of FSLC on workers of the informal sector is quite important, 
particularly in the agricultural segment where it reached 38% against 30% in the non-agricultural 
segment. But these estimates are biased because the poss ssion of FSLC is not randomly distributed, it 
depends on certain factors that can be observed or not observed. We will therefore proceed to a 
selectivity bias correction on observable variables th n a correction on unobservable variables.  
Table 2: Naive estimation of returns to education in the informal sector: OLS 
Non-agricultural Agricultural Variables 
Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error 
FSLC 0.30***  0.04 0.38***  0.05 
Potential experience 0.01***  0.01 0.01 0.01 
(Potential experience)^2 /100 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 
More than 32 years old 0.18***  0.04 0.21***  0.06 
Female -0.30***  0.03 -0.45***  0.05 
Union  (Married or Free union) 0.06**  0.03 0.08*  0.05 
Christian 0.05 0.07 0.20**  0.08 
Moslem  0.01 0.07 0.11 0.10 
Migrant 0.07**  0.03 0.08**  0.05 
Urban milieu  0.12***  0.03 0.27***  0.06 
Constant 4.52***  0.08 3.92***  0.10 
Statistics of the model     
Adjusted R2 (%) 11.3 12.8 
Observations  2°391 1°571 
Source : EESI (2005), Phase1. Our calculations. 
 *: significant at 10 %;   **: significant at 5 %;  ***: significant at 1 %. 
4.2 Correction of treatment selectivity based on observable variables: matching  
Estimating the probability of obtaining FSLC  
Table 3 summarizes the results on the estimation of the determinants of possession of FSLC. Whatever 
the segment, statistics on the quality of the model ar  satisfactory. In the non-agricultural sector, 44% of 
the variability is explained by the model against 27% in the rural sector. In addition, the model is able to 
allocate at least 83% of individuals in their observed categories.  
The main variable on worker’s father that explains the school course of a worker of the informal sector 
in Cameroon is the level of education. Indeed, a child whose father had a level of primary education had
four times more chances to obtain the FSLC compared to a child whose father had not been to school. 
This odd ratio is more than seven if this individual is compared to a worker whose father had reached 
the secondary education. For workers of the non-agricultural informal sector, the institutional sector and 
the branch of activity of the father have also influenced their school attendance. Because their parents 
were mostly working in the informal sector, they were less paid than those working in the formal sector. 
Therefore, they did not have enough financial resources to enrol their children at school.  
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Individual characteristics such as age, sex, religion and place of birth have also influenced the 
likelihood of obtaining FSLC. Whatever the segment, the effect of age is concave, with a pick around 
32 years. This means that a child born around 1971 was more likely to get the FSLC than a child born 
before or after. Persons born in rural areas were less likely to get the FSLC than those born in urban 
areas (province, division or subdivision headquarters); they were generally used as labour force in farm 
activities. This report helps to show the negative impact of child labour on child education. Finally, men 
have got at least two times more chances to get the FSLC than women, because of gender 
discrimination and certain traditions/customs that still hamper the education of Cameroonian young 
girls.  
Table 3: Estimated propensity for workers of the informal sector to obtain the FSLC  
  Non-agricultural Agricultural 
  Odds-ratio SE Odds-ratio SE 
Variables related to the father 
High rank officer 1.38 0.38 0.74 0.27 CSP (ref. : Self-employed 
worked) Employee 1.00 0.26 0.53**  0.17 
Sector of activity (ref: formal) Informal 1.50 0.38 2.16***  0.70 
Commerce/Industry  1.85***  0.32 1.46*  0.34 Branch of  activity (ref. : 
Agriculture, Fishery, Hearing) Services 1.61***  0.31 1.54*  0.41 
Primary  4.91***  0.71 4.27***  0.63 Level of education (ref. : No 
education) Secondary and + 11.34***  2.86 7.52***  2.56 
Variables related to the worker 
Age  1.34***  0.04 1.14***  0.03 
Age squared   1.00***  0.00 1.00***  0.00 
Female  0.31***  0.04 0.41***  0.05 
Christian 2.37***  0.60 2.53***  0.65 Religion (ref. : Other/No 
religion) Moslem 0.15***  0.04 0.18***  0.07 
Headquarter of 
Division/Subdivision 1.90***  0.26 2.00***  0.30 Lieu de naissance (ref. : 
village) 
Headquarter of province  1.98***  0.37 0.62 0.22 
Statistics of the model     
Pseudo R2 (in %)  44.0 27.0 
Area Under Roc Curve 
(AURC) en % 
 90.7 83.1 
Observations  2°382 1°581 
Source : EESI (2005), Phase1. Our calculations. 
 *: significant at 10 %;   **: significant at 5 %;  ***: significant at 1 %. 
Distribution of the propensity score and analysis of the common support  
With the variables used to model the likelihood to obtain FSLC we have implement the algorithm of 
Ichino and Becker (2002) to identify variables permitting to have a score verifying the balance 
propriety. Results show that, whatever the segment all the initially selected variables are balanced at the 
threshold 0.1%, thus these variables were retained in the computation of the propensity score.  
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The propensity score is simply the predicted probability of obtaining the FSLC derived from the logit 
equation modelling the likelihood of obtaining the FSLC. Individuals are matched with respect to the 
segment to which they belong: non-agricultural workers on one side and agricultural workers on the 
other side. Before matching, it is necessary to analyze the spectrum of the score distributions in both 
groups (treated and non-treated) to identify individuals who fall within the common support.  
The common support has been determined using the rule of min-max. This rule compares the minimum 
and maximum score in both groups (treated and non-treated). Individuals who are on the common 
support are those whose score is equal or greater than the maximum of the minimum values and less or 
equal to the minimum of maximum values. The application of this rule shows that whatever the 
institutional sector, more than 95% of individuals re on the common support. Therefore, individuals 
from both groups have close characteristics looking to observable variables. 
Table 4: Statistics on the score and the common support 
 Non-agricultural informal  Agricultural informal 
Score  Treated Non-treated Treated Non-treated 
Minimum 0.0623 0.0001 0.0474 0.0002 
Maximum 0.994 0.988 0.986 0.956 
common Support      
Observations  938 1°471 602 997 
Percentage  95.1 96.4 
Source : EESI (2005), Phase1. Our calculations.  
Matching 
We tested two matching methods: one-to-one matching with replacement and Epanechnikov kernel 
matching. Both methods have been restricted to the support common because the inclusion of 
individuals who are out of this region biases estima es. The two techniques effectively permit to reduce 
the differences between the average characteristics of the treatment and the control groups. But kernel 
methods are more efficient. As shown in the tables A4 and A5 (in appendix), they better bring closer 
the two groups in terms of average characteristics. For example, considering the agricultural segment, 
we can note that with one-to-one matching the average  characteristics of the treatment group are 
significantly different to those of the control group with regard to the dummy variables Christian, High 
rank officer and Commerce/Industry. Whereas, with kernel Epanechnikov matching, no average 
characteristic is significantly different between the two groups. Moreover, whatever the segment, there 
is no significant difference of the average effect of education on the treated when the bandwidth varies 
between 0.04 and 0.08. We finally adopted the bandwidth h = 0.06; this value was also used by 
Blundell and Sianesi Barbara (2001).  
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Table 4 presents the average treatment effects after matching. It shows that the returns to primary 
education for workers of the informal sector in Cameroon are considerable and significant at the 
threshold 1%. These benefits are lower than those obtained with the OLS method which is biased.  
In the agricultural segment, the returns of FSLC on the hourly earnings of workers who have this 
certificate are estimated to 20%. In other words, if these workers had not successfully completed 
primary education, their incomes would have been 20% less than what they have now. Furthermore, if 
workers of this segment not having the FSLC had gotten i , their income would improve by 23%. So, if 
workers not having the FSLC return to school and got the certificate, the impact on their income would 
be at least equal to the initial training received by workers currently graduated, assuming that the age at 
which the certificate is obtained does not affect the reatment returns. The average benefit of basic 
education on the workers of the non-agricultural informal sector is an increase of their earnings by 21%.  
In the agricultural segment, the returns to schooling are even greater. Indeed, returns of primary 
education on the income of workers holding the FSLC are about 28%. While, non-graduated workers 
would have earned 25% more if they had graduated. The average benefits of FSLC on the income of 
agricultural workers are estimated to 26%.  
In summary, basic education plays an important roleon the income of Cameroon informal sector 
workers. This proves the importance of human capital on income levels, poverty reduction and 
economic growth.  
Table 5: Returns to basic education in the informal sector: matching method 
Non agricultural Agricultural 
Returns of FSLC  
Estimation SE Estimation SE 
On the income of workers holding the FSLC : TT∆  20.0***  4.9 27.6***  6.1 
On the income of workers not having the FSLC : TNT∆  22.7***  7.2 25.1***  7.4 
On the income of workers : ATE∆  21.0***  5.5 26.0***  5.9 
Source : EESI (2005), Phase1. Our calculations 
  Bootstrapped standard errors (200 replications) 
*: significant at 10 %;   **: significant at 5 %;  ***: significant at 1 %. 
4.3 Correction of treatment selectivity based on unobservable variables  
The model reveals two important results. First, there is a bias induced by unobservable; because, 
whatever the segment, the variable Lambda that captures the action of unobservable variables is 
significant at 1%. But its negative sign indicates a negative influence of these unobservable on the 
income of workers. Secondly, having followed the basic education significantly influences (at the 
threshold 1%) the income of workers of the informal sector. The average treatment effect of the FSLC 
is estimated at 22% in the non-agricultural segment and it is around 28% in the agricultural segment. 
These effects are similar to those obtained with the matching model but are significantly lower than the
values obtained with the naive model which overstate  parameters.  
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Table 6: Returns to basic education in the informal sector: selection on unobservable model 
Non-agricultural Agricultural Variables 
Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error 
FSLC 0.22***  0.04 0.28*** 0.05 
Potential experience 0.01 ** 0.01 0.00 0.01 
(Potential experience)^2 /100 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
More than 32 years old 0.22***  0.04 0.29*** 0.06 
Female -0.26***  0.03 -0.36*** 0.05 
Union  (Married or Free union) 0.08**  0.03 0.11** 0.05 
Christian -0.02 0.07 0.05 0.08 
Moslem  0.18**  0.07 0.21** 0.10 
Migrant 0.08**  0.03 0.08* 0.05 
Urban milieu  0.08***  0.03 0.23*** 0.06 
Lambda  -0.29***  0.04 -0.40*** 0.06 
Constant 4.75***  0.08 4.39*** 0.12 
Statistics of the model     
Adjusted R2 (%) 13.0 15.1 
Observations  2°532 1°659 
Source : EESI (2005), Phase1. Our calculations. 
 *: significant at 10 %;   **: significant at 5 %;  ***: significant at 1 %. 
4.4 Returns to the first cycle of secondary education on informal sector workers 
With the same methodology, we now analyze the effect of obtaining the GCE-OL (General Certificate 
of Education, Ordinary Level) on informal sector workers. Here the treatment group is made of workers 
exercising in the informal sector who have the GCE-OL or a certificate that is superior and the control 
group regroups workers who have just had the FSLC. This allows us to assess the net impact of the first 
cycle of secondary education on the incomes of workers. We apply the kernel Epanechnikov matching 
(taking the bandwidth = 0.06) and we also implement the selection on unobservable model. 
Selection on observable  
Observable variables that we consider in the computation of the propensity score are the same we have 
used in estimating the probability of obtaining FSLC. This score assesses the likelihood of obtaining the 
GCE-OL conditionally to the possession of the FSLC. The examination of spectra of scores shows that 
in the non-agricultural segment 99.6% of observations fall within the common support against 96.5% in 
the agricultural segment.  
The matching shows that the returns to GCE-OL on the income of workers of the non-agricultural 
sector who have this certificate are estimated to 33%. On the other hand, if workers who have FSLC 
return to school and obtain the GCE-OL, this will increase their income by 30% assuming that the age 
at which the certificate is obtained does not affect the benefits it provides. The average effect of the first 
cycle of secondary education on workers of the non-agricultural sector having the FSLC is estimated at 
31%. In contrary, in the agricultural segment the av r ge effect of GCE-OL on the income of workers 
may be very low, quite zero; in fact, none of the tree parameters is significant.  
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Table 7: Returns to the secondary education first cycle in the informal sector: matching method 
Non agricultural Agricultural 
Returns to GCE-OL 
Estimation SE Estimation SE 
On the income of workers holding the GCE-OL : TT∆  33.0***  4.9 12.9 12.3 
On the income of workers not having the GCE-OL but 
holders of the FSLC : TNT∆  29.9***  5.4 21.6 13.9 
On the income of workers having the FSLC : ATE∆  31.0***  5.1 20.2 12.7 
Source : EESI (2005), Phase1. Our calculations 
  Bootstrapped standard errors (200 replications) 
*: significant at 10 %;   **: significant at 5 %;  ***: significant at 1 %. 
Selection on unobservable  
The model selection on unobservable is justified in both segment, since the inverse Mills ratio 
(Lambda) is significant at 1% threshold, which confirms the existence of unobservable variables 
affecting both the possession of GCE-OL and the income. Several control variables related to the 
potential experience, religion and marital status are not significant. But excluding these variables does 
not significantly affect the other coefficients.  
In the non-agricultural sector, the variable GCE-OL reflecting the possession or not of the GCE-OL is 
significant at threshold of 1% and it indicates that the average benefits of this certificate on the income 
of workers of the non-agricultural informal sector are around 31%. In opposite, in the rural sector this 
variable is not significant. So the possession of GCE-OL would have no impact on the income of 
workers exercising in agricultural activities. The results obtained with the selection on unobservable 
model thus converge with those of the matching method.  
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Table 8: Returns to the secondary education first cycle in the informal sector: selection on unobservable 
model  
Non-agricultural Agricultural Variables  
Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error 
GCE-OL 0.31***  0.04 0.11 0.11 
Potential experience 0.02*  0.01 0.02 0.01 
(Potential experience)^2 /100 -0.04 0.05 -0.03 0.03 
More than 32 years old 0.09*  0.05 0.27***  0.08 
Female -0.18***  0.04 0.41**  0.18 
Union  (Married or Free union) 0.06 0.04 -0.03 0.08 
Christian -0.09 0.09 0.22 0.18 
Moslem  0.00 0.10 -0.01 0.23 
Migrant 0.14***  0.04 -0.04 0.07 
Urban milieu  0.05 0.04 0.06 0.09 
Lambda  -0.35***  0.06 -1.02***  0.23 
Constant 5.19***  0.13 5.67***  0.31 
Statistics of the model     
Adjusted R2 (%) 14.9 11.1 
Observations  1°471 574 
Source : EESI (2005), Phase1. Our calculations. 
 *: significant at 10 %;   **: significant at 5 %;  ***: significant at 1 %. 
4.5 Selection at the entry into the informal sector and determinants of sectoral allocation  
We are now testing the selection at the entry into the informal sector; since the previous earnings 
equations have been restricted, ignoring the existence of the formal sector; they can therefore be biased. 
Then, we will search for the determinants of sectoral allocation. The sample is the set of potentially 
active persons (aged of 15 years and above) interviewed during the survey EESI. 
Selection test at the entry into the informal sector  
The results of the test (see Table 9 below) show that the inverse Mills ratio (Lambda) is significant and 
positive in the equations of formal sector segments (public and private) and it is negative in the informal 
sector equations. But in the non-agricultural sector, this variable is not significant, even at the threshold 
10%. So in formal sectors (public or private), the unobserved characteristics affecting the sectoral 
“choice” of an individual also affect his wage once h  gets in this sector. In the rural segment these 
characteristics play harmfully on the potential earnings of workers and in the non-agricultural segment 
they have no impact. Thus, Cameroonian workers exercising in the informal sector have not made their 
choice so as to maximize their potential earnings as it should have been the case in a competitive 
market. They therefore found themselves there against their wish; because they were unable to enter 
into the formal sector.  
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Table 9: Selectivity test at the entry into the labour market segments 





FSLC 0.45***  0.22**  0.32***  0.36***  
Potential experience 0.03***  0.03***  0.02***  0.00 
(Potential experience)^2 /100 -0.05*  -0.04 -0.05***  0.00 
More than 32 years old 0.18***  0.27***  0.20***  0.24***  
Female -0.13***  0.37***  -0.34***  -0.36***  
Union  (Married or Free union) 0.00 0.15***  0.09***  0.04 
Christian 0.05 0.02 0.19*  0.28***  
Moslem  -0.12 0.00 0.10***  0.30***  
Migrant 0.14***  0.06 0.07***  0.08**  
Urban milieu  0.28***  0.17***  0.17***  0.22***  
Constant 6.10***  6.09***  4.31***  3.74***  
Lambda (Selectivity test ) 0.51***  0.71***  -0.04 -0.15***  
Statistics of the model     
Adjusted R2 (%) 30.4 29.2 10.5 9.5 
Observations  1°204 1°160 6°572 3°540 
Source : EESI (2005), Phase1. Our calculations. 
 *: significant at 10 %;   **: significant at 5 %;  ***: significant at 1 %. 
Determinants of sectoral allocation  
The sectoral allocation model presented in appendix (table A10) shows that Hausman-McFadden 
(1984) specification test which indicates the probability to wrongly reject the null hypothesis (of 
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives) is significant at 1%. This is to say that, sectoral allocation is a 
random process. A working age person first chooses to participate into the labour market or to be 
inactive. Then, active persons are then divided betwe n unemployed persons and workers of the 
different segments. 
We note that variables related to family environment play a major role in the decision of individuals to 
participate or not into the labour market. Family responsibilities apprehended by the number of little 
children and the fact of being the household head persuade individuals to seek for a job. As against, the 
presence of inactive persons in the household negativ ly influences the chances of its members to enter 
the job market. The involvement of individuals in the informal sector is determined by variables related 
to family environment. The effect of these variables on the probability for persons to participate in the
labour market was also highlighted by El Aynaoui, (1998) with Morocco data.  
Education plays a fundamental role on the occupation l status of people. The probability of being 
unemployed increases with the level of education; qualified people preferring to remain unemployed 
rather than engaging themselves into the informal sector characterized by precarious jobs and low 
incomes. Moreover, the probability of entering formal segments increases sharply with the level of 
education. But it is the opposite effect in the informal segments where the probability of entry is 
decreasing with the level of education.  
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5. Conclusion  
The study envisaged to analyze the returns to schooling n workers of the Cameroonian informal sector. 
We have implemented matching on observables methods an  selection on unobservables models to 
assess the effects of basic education on the income of people working in the informal sector (non-
agricultural and agricultural). The study has also analyzed the benefits of the first cycle of secondary 
education on these workers.  
The results obtained with both methods are converging and confirm the positive impact of education on 
the incomes of informal sector workers. The benefits brought by the completion of basic education 
(possession of the FSLC) are estimated to 20% in the non-agricultural sector and to 28% in the rural 
sector. But, if non-educated workers now return to school and obtain the FSLC (or an equivalent 
certificate), this will increase their income by 22% to 25%, assuming that the age at which the 
certificate is obtained does not affect the potential benefits it provides.  
The effects of the completion of the first cycle of secondary education on the incomes of the workers of 
non-agricultural sector are even more important. The possession of GCE-OL helps to increase by 33% 
the income of those who have this certificate, while the loss of workers who have stopped at the FSLC 
is about 30%. The average treatment effect of GCE-OL on the income of the non-agricultural sector 
workers is estimated to 31%. But, in the agricultural segment the returns of this qualification would be 
quite zero. However, this result should be confirmed by other studies.  
In addition, the selection test at the entry into the informal sector has revealed the existence of a 
selectivity bias affecting the results of the agricultural sector. However, the results of the non-
agricultural sector are not affected by this bias. This test also showed that the Cameroonian workers 
exercising in the informal sector have not made their choice so as to maximize their potential earnings 
as it should have been the case in a competitive market. They therefore found themselves there because 
they were unable to enter into the formal sector.  
Education plays a fundamental role in the occupation status of people. The probability of being 
unemployed and entering into the formal sector increases with the level of education; on the contrary 
the probability of entering the informal sector declines with schooling. The entering in this sector is 
mainly determined by the family environment.  
In summary, the study puts the spotlight on the rolof basic education and the first cycle of secondary 
education in Cameroon informal sector; which yields uncertain individual returns. Lessons learned will
therefore appeal for greater accessibility to education at least until the first cycle of secondary 
education. The Cameroonian government should intervene to improve the access to education and its 
quality. Because even if primary education was declar d free of charge in Cameroon since 2000, we 
must acknowledge that the results of this policy are not very suitable. Indeed, education supply of is still 
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very low since there is a lack of school infrastructure in many rural areas. There is also an overcrowding 
of pupils, a lack of teachers, a lack of equipment etc. The consequences are high repetition rates and 
high dropout rates. 
The Cameroonian government should recruit more teachers, build and equip schools, strengthen 
vocational training and also develop and implement a national social education policy to help poor 
parents who have no means to buy school materials for their children. In a medium term, free schooling 
could be extended to the first cycle of secondary education. Furthermore, the government could regulate 
the informal sector actors; introduce incentive programmes to encourage young graduates to enter the 
informal sector (for example, granting of credits, tax exemption for a number of years, etc.). The central 
administration may also organize free of charge vocati nal training (teach rural farmers new 
agricultural technologies with high efficiency) and implement policies for the follow-up of efficient 
informal production units in order to facilitate their transition into the formal sector. 
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Table A1: Distribution of workers in the informal sector by category  











Non-agricultural  5.1 59.7 21.6 13.5 100.0 
Agricultural  2.2 63.3 2.0 32.6 100.0 
Together 3.4 61.8 10.2 24.7 100.0 
Source : EESI (2005), Phase1. Our calculations. Weighted data 
 
 
Table A2: Distribution of the sample of informal sector workers considered in estimating the returns to 
education  
Survey region Non agricultural  Agricultural Total 
Douala 422 10 432 
Yaounde 359 9 368 
Adamaoua 164 104 268 
Centre-yde 178 163 341 
East 123 179 302 
Far north 273 92 365 
Littoral-dla 113 134 247 
North 234 237 471 
North west 201 243 444 
West 238 298 536 
South 77 52 129 
South west 150 138 288 
Cameroon 2532 1659 4191 
Source : EESI (2005), Phase1. Our calculations. 
 
 
Table A3: Distribution of the sample of the study by the highest Certificate  
Non agricultural  Agricultural 
Certificate 
Observations Frequency Observations Frequency 
No certificate 972 38.4 1054 63.5 
FSLC 991 39.1 514 31.0 
GCE-OL and + 569 22.5 91 5.5 
Together 2532 100.0 1659 100.0 
Source : EESI (2005), Phase1. Our calculations. 
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Source : EESI (2005), Phase1. Our calculations 
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Table A4: Average characteristics of workers of the non-agricultural sector before and after matching 
methods  
After matching 







h=0.08 Characteristics    
TG 
Difference 









Log of the hourly income 4.723 0.305*** 5.007 0.167*** 0.199*** 0.200*** 0.201*** 
Individual characteristics           
Age 36.084 -5.704*** 30.407 -0.257 0.318 0.332 0.322 
Female 0.468 -0.061*** 0.432 0.067*** 0.059*** 0.057*** 0.053*** 
Christian 0.436 0.388*** 0.814 -0.035** -0.008 -0.08 -0.008 
Moslem 0.514 -0.389*** 0.133 0.025** -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
Province 0.141 0.146*** 0.272 0.051*** 0.053*** 0.056*** 0.059*** 
Division  0.427 0.040* 0.467 -0.018 -0.023 -0.025 -0.023 
Father’s characteristics         
Primary 0.215 0.232*** 0.475 -0.061*** -0.046** -0.47** -0.047** 
Secondary and + 0.063 0.239*** 0.260 0.073*** 0.043*** 0.045*** 0.046*** 
High rank officer 0.065 0.117*** 0.154 0.004 0.017 0.018 0.018 
Employee 0.148 0.172*** 0.319 -0.016 -0.027 -0.026 -0.025 
Commerce/ Industry 0.179 0.029* 0.211 0.021 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 
Services  0.199 0.225*** 0.398 0.015 0.007 0.008 0.011 
Informal sector  0.146 0.283*** 0.396 -0.003 0.008 0.010 0.014 
Source : EESI (2005), Phase1. Our calculations. 
 *: significant at 10 %;   **: significant at 5 %;  ***: significant at 1 %. 
TG= Treated Group         CG= Control Group  
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Table A5: Average characteristics of workers of the agricultural sector before and after matching methods 
After matching 







h=0.08 Characteristics    
TG 
Difference 









Log of the hourly income 4.598 0.371*** 4.594 0.226*** 0.272*** 0.276*** 0.279*** 
Individual characteristics         
Age 36.760 -7.883*** 36.784 0.339 0.389 0.301 0.252 
Female 0.451 -0.103*** 0.453 -0.005 0.004 -0.001 -0.002 
Christian 0.894 0.213*** 0.894 -0.032* -0.020 -0.017 -0.016 
Moslem 0.055 -0.166*** 0.055 0.008 0.016 0.015 0.015 
Province 0.043 0.014* 0.043 0.010 0.001 0.000 -0.001 
Division  0.349 0.155*** 0.346 0.017 0.013 0.010 0.012 
Father’s characteristics         
Primary 0.474 0.305*** 0.477 -0.013 0.029 0.032 0.032 
Secondary and + 0.099 0.078*** 0.095 0.000 -0.003 -0.006 -0.004 
High rank officer 0.063 0.027*** 0.058 0.030** 0.014 0.014 0.014 
Employee 0.197 0.116*** 0.198 -0.033 -0.011 -0.006 -0.001 
Commerce/ Industry 0.109 0.036* 0.110 0.038** 0.017 0.015 0.015 
Services  0.203 0.126*** 0.199 -0.002 0.005 0.012 0.018 
Informal sector  0.213 0.149*** 0.209 -0.008 0.000 0.004 0.009 
Source : EESI (2005), Phase1. Our calculations. 
 *: significant at 10 %;   **: significant at 5 %;  ***: significant at 1 %. 





Table A6: Estimation of the propensity of having the GCE-OL among informal sector workers  
holders of the FSLC  
  Non-agricultural Agricultural 
  Odds-ratio SE Odds-ratio SE 
Variables related to the father 
High rank officer 1.58**  0.40 0.45 0.51 CSP (ref. : Self-employed 
worked) Employee 1.07 0.26 0.14*  0.16 
Sector of activity (ref: formal) Informal 1.43*  0.31 2.69 2.98 
Commerce/Industry  1.12 0.21 1.33 0.72 Branch of  activity (ref. : 
Agriculture, Fishery, Hearing) Services 1.23 0.24 0.60 0.38 
Primary  1.51**  0.26 1.77*  0.59 Level of education (ref. : No 
education) Secondary and + 3.63***  0.76 1.04 0.67 
Variables related to the worker 
Age  1.39***  0.06 1.05 0.06 
Age squared   1.00***  0.00 1.00 0.00 
Female  0.38***  0.05 0.01***  0.01 
Christian 1.31 0.37 0.50 0.29 Religion (ref. : Other/No 
religion) Moslem 0.89 0.29 0.29 0.25 
Headquarter of 
Division/Subdivision 2.66***  0.48 
2.21**  0.71 
Place of birth (ref. : village) 
Headquarter of province  1.58***  0.26 3.82*  2.67 
Statistics of the model     
Pseudo R2 (in %)  15.6 22.8 
Area Under Roc Curve 
(AURC) en % 
 75.7 82.9 
Observations  1°513 571 
Source : EESI (2005), Phase1. Our calculations. 
 *: significant at 10 %;   **: significant at 5 %;  ***: significant at 1 %. 
 
 
















Source : EESI (2005), Phase1. Our calculations. 
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Table A7: Distribution of the sample of people of 15 years old and above according to the activity situation  
Situation of the person Observations Frequency 
Inactive 5848 26.2 
Unemployed 1681 7.5 
Public sector 1226 5.5 
Private formal sector 1199 5.4 
Non-agricultural informal sector 7659 34.3 
Agricultural informal sector 4739 21.2 
Total 22352 100.0 
Source : EESI (2005), Phase1. Our calculations. 
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Table A8: Summary characteristics of the sample of persons of 15 years old and above  
Variable Mean Std Dev 
Milieu of residence   
Yaoundé/Douala 0.325 0.003 
Other towns 0.280 0.003 
Rural  0.395 0.003 
Individual characteristics    
No education 0.146 0.002 
Primary 0.317 0.003 
Secondary  1er cycle 0.303 0.003 
Secondary 2nd cycle and + 0.234 0.003 
Age  30.715 0.086 
Female 0.510 0.003 
Family environment    
Household head 0.363 0.003 
Be in union(married or free union) 0.409 0.003 
Proportion of children of 0-4 years in the household 0.122 0.001 
Proportion of children of 5-9 years in the household 0.122 0.001 
Proportion of jobless persons in the household  0.637 0.002 
Number of hours devoted to domestic works per week  16.208 0.106 
Number of hours devoted to schooling per week  4.237 0.084 
Source : EESI (2005), Phase1. Our calculations 
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Table A9: Multinomial selection Model (odds ratios)  
 
Public Private formal Non-agricultural  informal 
Agricultural 
informal 
Yaoundé/Douala 0.48***  1.39***  1.14**  0.03***  Milieu of residence  
(ref.: rural milieu) Other Towns 1.08 1.41***  1.49***  0.30***  
Primary 10.18***  4.94***  1.34***  2.00***  
Sec 1er cycle 26.05***  8.13***  1.28***  1.27***  
Level of education 
(ref. : No education )
Sec 2nd cycle and + 121.34***  15.17***  0,83**  0.55***  
Age  2.02***  1.83***  1.44***  1.45***  
Age squared 0.99***  0.99***  1.00***  1.00***  
Female 0.76**  0.33***  0.71***  0.66***  
Household head 6.91***  6.08***  5.35***  4.77***  
Be in union  1.41***  0.96 0.86***  1.20***  
% children of 0-4 years old in the household 8.63***  14.96***  30.14***  74.88***  
% children of 5-9 years old in the household 13.87***  25.46***  41.00***  91.28***  
% working age persons in the household who 
have no income 0.00***  0.00***  0.00***  0.00***  
Number of hours devoted to domestic works per 
week 0.97***  0.96***  0.99***  1.00 
Number of hours devoted to schooling per week 0.96***  0.94***  0.96***  0.95***  
Statistics of the model  
Pseudo R2 (%) 40.9 
LR χ2(60)  24181.11 
Observations 22°352 
Source : EESI (2005), Phase1. Our calculations. 
 *: significant at 10 %;   **: significant at 5 %;  ***: significant at 1 %. 
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Table A10: Determinants of the sectoral allocation 
Unemployed 





OR SE OR SE OR SE OR SE OR SE 
Yaoundé/Douala 1.25***  0.10 0.32 0.03 0.93 0.09 0.71***  0.04 0.02***  0.00 
Milieu of residence  
(ref.: rural milieu) 
Other Towns 1.49***  0.12 0.86 0.09 1.11 0.12 1.14**  0.07 0.23***  0.01 
Primary 4.87***  0.69 16.48 5.53 8.63***  1.92 2.35***  0.17 2.78***  0.20 
Sec 1er cycle 4.78***  0.68 33.66 11.22 10.67***  2.39 1.70***  0.13 1.43***  0.12 
Level of education 
(ref. : No education )
Sec 2nd cycle and 
+ 
4.81***  0.71 146.57 48.58 18.34***  4.12 0.97***  0.08 0.63***  0.07 
Age  1,40***  0.02 2,05 0.05 1.81***  0.04 1.41***  0.01 1.34***  0.01 
Age squared 1,00***  0.00 0,99 0.00 0.99***  0.00 1.00***  0.00 1.00***  0.00 
Female 0,63***  0.05 0,67 0.07 0.30***  0.03 0.64***  0.04 0.57***  0.04 
Household head 2,08***  0.19 5,81 0.65 5.34***  0.58 4.41***  0.32 2.97***  0.24 
Be in union  0,87* 0.07 1,11 0.11 0.76***  0.07 0.63***  0.04 0.79***  0.05 
% children of 0-4 years old in the household 0,76 0.17 2,90 0.88 4.45***  1.34 7.55***  1.30 9.34***  1.82 
% children of 5-9 years old in the household 0,51***  0.12 5,53 1.68 9.62***  2.93 14.05***  2.46 19.42***  3.82 
% working age persons in the household who 
have no income 
0,83 0.15 0,00 0.00 0.00***  0.00 0.00***  0.00 0.00***  0.00 
Number of hours devoted to domestic works 
per week 
1,01***  0.00 0,98 0.00 0.97***  0.00 0.99***  0.00 1.00 0.00 
Number of hours devoted to schooling per 
week 
0,97***  0.00 0,95 0.01 0.93***  0.01 0.95***  0.00 0.95***  0.00 
Statistics of the model  
Pseudo R2 (%) 32.0 
LR χ2(75)  22260. 31 
Hausman test ( χ2(60) ) 345. 37 
Observations 22°352 
Source : EESI (2005), Phase1. Our calculations. 
 *: significant at 10 %;   **: significant at 5 %;  ***: significant at 1 %. 
 
 
 
